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AUTONOMY AND FREE SPEECH
C. Edwin Baker*
The legitimacy of the legal order depends, in part, on it
respecting the autonomy that it must attribute to the people
whom it asks to obey its laws. Despite the plethora of values
served by speech, the need for this respect, I claim, provides the
proper basis for giving free speech constitutional status.
To justify this claim requires development of five points.
First, because the concept of autonomy (or the analogous
concept of liberty, treated here as largely interchangeable) is
notoriously slippery and subject to varying usages, Part I
specifies the particular conception of autonomy that I consider
constitutionally relevant and distinguishes it from a prominent
alternative that, I believe, should be central legislatively as long
as the legislation is consistent with the first conception. Second,
since this version of autonomy is, in a sense, simply stipulated,
the claim that it is the relevant conception for establishing legal
legitimacy and, hence, should have a constitutionally
foundational role requires defense and must be connected to
constitutional interpretation. That is the subject of Part II. Part
II also considers the often raised question of whether any
constitutional or foundational role for autonomy should or even
can be limited to speech or expressive behavior. Third, it must
be shown that this conception of autonomy has sufficient bite to
give relatively determinate answers to important First
Amendment issues. Fourth, this proposed content must survive
reflective equilibrium. For these tasks, giving protection to
autonomy need not, and probably should not, duplicate (or
merely describe or explain) existing constitutional holdings but
should lead to a satisfying account of why many holdings are
right and an appealing (or at least plausible) explanation of
which other holdings should be rejected. Part III considers these
two issues. Finally, interwoven into the remarks is development

* Before his death in December of 2009, C. Edwin Baker was the Nicholas F.
Gallicchio Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
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of a view that, rather than free speech being an essential
attribute of an otherwise undefended but merely described
theory of democracy or, maybe, of “our democracy,” legal
legitimacy—and respect for autonomy—requires both
constitutional democracy and also broad speech freedom that
encompasses non-political speech as a necessary limit on
majoritarian or popular rule.
Those who disparage autonomy as a basic, virtually absolute
First Amendment value usually take one of three tacks. First,
they stipulate or imply that autonomy (or liberty) refers to an
1
individual doing whatever she chooses. This stipulation, often
an intellectually lazy way to avoid thinking through the legal
implications of a state commitment to respect autonomy, makes
the term virtually meaningless for purposes of constructive legal
theory or political theory (but maybe not moral theory where
the question is often, “should I do this act, obey this law?”). Part
I offers an alternative stipulation that, Part II claims, is required
by constitutional and political theory. Second, they treat a laissez
faire economic order as an implicit aspect of respecting
2
autonomy—a view illustrated by many critical comments here.
Recognizing the problem this claim has for my views, I focused
on and rejected this claim in my first published writing about
3
free speech, and restate my rejection here in Part III’s discussion of commercial speech. I conclude that right-wing
libertarian theory invokes an ideologically useful (to them) but
4
intellectually indefensible conception of autonomy. Third, most
plausibly, those who do not regard autonomy as an absolute
value, view the only humanly meaningful conception of autonomy to be some version of substantive autonomy, a view that
1. Compare Robert Post, Participatory Democracy as a Theory of Free Speech: A
Reply, 97 VA. L. REV. 617, 624–25 (2011) with C. Edwin Baker, Harm, Liberty, and Free
Speech, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 979, 981 (1997) (“[T]he harmfulness of behavior does not, as a
general matter, justify legal limits on liberty.”). Post believes that all past societies, which
I would add have all been objectionably hierarchical or oppressive or both, have
coercively (legally) enforced civility rules. I certainly agree that, in some form, such rules
have helped constitute the community on which individual identity depends, but this
does not support his view that what would begin to unravel if enforcement were left to
voluntary compliance would be society as opposed to hierarchy and oppression.
2. See, e.g., Post, supra note 1, at 627–28.
3. See generally C. Edwin Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of
Freedom, 62 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1976) (arguing that a complete denial of first amendment
protection for commercial speech is required by first amendment theory).
4. C. Edwin Baker, Property and Its Relation to Constitutionally Protected
Liberty,134 U. PA. L. REV. 741, 815 (1986) (“While a formal conception of liberty
encompasses the right to participate in this collective decisionmaking, it does not dictate
the existence of any particular set of economic opportunities.”).
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would lead, for example, to the type of balancing advocated by
5
Steve Shiffrin. In the face of this pragmatic challenge, Part II
seeks to show that a formal conception has relevance as a side
constraint on law necessary for legal legitimacy and appropriate
for constitutional theory. If successful, this illustrates the civil
libertarian instinct that the constitution restrains the “means”
government uses to pursue even good ends as well as prohibits
subordinating or enslaving people as permissible ends.
I. THE CONCEPT OF AUTONOMY

6

A person’s autonomy might reasonably be conceived as her
capacity to pursue successfully the life she endorses—selfauthored at least in the sense that, no matter how her image of a
meaningful life originates, she now can endorse that life for
reasons that she accepts. Surely complete autonomy in this sense
is never perfectly realized but will exist only more or less on
various continuums. Such autonomy is dependent on the
presence, often the distribution, of material resources,
psychological resources, and other natural and social conditions.
Policy measures—laws or distributions—that increase one
person’s autonomy in this sense will often decrease another
person’s. This and related conceptions of autonomy I will call
substantive theories. My general view is that promoting
substantive autonomy, along with matters of collective selfdefinition, should be a major aim of the state and the legal order.
Still, the precise choice of state aims is an appropriate subject of
politics, which inevitably balances advantages for those with
5. Steven Shiffrin, Dissent, Democratic Participation, and First Amendment
Methodology, 97 VA. L. REV. 559, 559–60 (2011).
6. The approach to autonomy presented in this section, implicit in all my First
Amendment writing, is explicitly developed in C. Edwin Baker, Autonomy and
Informational Privacy, or Gossip: The Central Meaning of the First Amendment, 21 SOC.
PHIL. & POL’Y 215 (2004). I recognize the diversity of uses of the term. For example, my
“formal” conception, because of its emphasis on an individual’s right to rely on her own
conceptions of the good and the right in respect to her use of her body or voice, might be
viewed as the opposite of autonomy in a Kantian sense because such uses reflect
heteronomy rather than self-legislation free of phenomenal influences or conceptions of
the good. Possibly my usage reflects my first approaching the need for such a word from
the perspective of legal and constitutional rather than moral theory. In any event, some
label is needed to describe the principles I wish to defend describing the conception that
a state must attribute to its subjects whom it wishes to obligate; given my stipulated
usage, autonomy seems to work. Perhaps Tim Scanlon would want to criticize my specific
stipulated usage—or, maybe argue that no principles, putting aside the specific label, are
useful in this area but, instead, each issue should be discussed on its own bottom without
attempts to describe defend general principles. See T. M. Scanlon, Baker on Autonomy,
27 CONST. COMMENT. 321–23 (2011).
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some ideals against advantages for those with other conceptions
7
of the good. The key claim to be advanced here, however, is a
caveat: pursuit of this and other state aims should only use
means that respect a more formal conception of autonomy of
8
each person.
In the formal conception, autonomy consists of a person’s
authority (or right) to make decisions about herself—her own
meaningful actions and usually her use of her resources—as long
as her actions do not block others’ similar authority or rights.
This formal autonomy in relation to one’s self does not include
any right to exercise power over others. It does, however,
encompass self-expressive rights that include, for example, a
right to seek to persuade or unite or associate with others—or to
offend, expose, condemn, or disassociate with them. This formal
conception might seem relatively easy to apply in relation to
speech though clarification is useful even there. More difficult
may be applying it to other behavior. Nevertheless, I have
argued elsewhere that this formal conception is coherent and
warrants virtually absolute protection from, and respect by, the
state especially in relation to self-expressive or value-expressive
9
behavior.
Three features of this formal conception should be noted.
(Hereafter, references only to autonomy should, unless the
context clearly indicates otherwise, be understood to refer to this
formal conception.) First, a person’s formal autonomy is not
limited to acts that do not harm another person’s substantive
autonomy but rather is limited to those acts that do not interfere
with another’s equal formal autonomy. Most obviously, A’s
autonomous acts can harm B competitively, by persuading C in a
manner harmful to B’s goals. A can also convince B, for better
or worse, to have some view or follow some ideal that B would
not otherwise have or pursue—a pursuit that can damage B’s (or
others’) substantive autonomy. Alice might convince Betty that
she is personally worthless or that she should only act to serve
Alice’s desires. Alice can convince Carol that Betty, Carol’s
spouse, is worthless or unfaithful, making Betty’s life miserable
7. C. Edwin Baker, Rawls, Equality, and Democracy, 34 PHIL. & SOC. CRITICISM
203, 203 (2008) (arguing that John Rawls’s view of the goals of democracy is not
justifiable).
8. The term “liberty” could (occasionally herein does) substitute for “autonomy”
and I do not intend to signal anything by the substitution. My two uses of autonomy
roughly correspond to a common but often confused distinction between negative and
positive liberty, with substantive autonomy paralleling the later.
9. See generally Baker, supra note 1.
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when C leaves. Or Alice might simply persuade Carol to choose
to socialize with Alice rather than Betty to Betty’s great regret.
In each case, B and C still have authority, are still authorized, to
make choices contrary to the choices to which A’s speech leads
them. Political and religious analogs to these harms are
straightforward. As noted below, however, the characterization
should change in each example if A creates the effect by lying
(or speaking without regard to her belief in the truth of what she
says). In general, though, statements of A, even if harmful of B,
are exercises of A’s autonomy and are not coercive of either B
or C.
Second, in order to identify when someone’s behavior
interferes with another’s decisions presupposes some
distribution, constituted by a legitimate legal order, of decision
making authority. This distribution, largely constituted by
property rights, should reflect the interaction of a democratically
authorized (legal) framework, individual acts, and moral
requirements of equality and justice. Though some argument is
needed, the later moral constraint leads to a demand that
allocation of a person’s body should be based, at least to a
considerable degree not further investigated here, on respect for
the autonomy of the person whose body it is. Democratic
decision making should not be understood as authorized to
establish slavery—or authorized to create a baseline distribution
to A (possibly a husband or parent) of general authority over B’s
body or, more relevantly here, B’s speech—though proper
paternalism in respect to children raises issues that I put aside.
The fact that meaningful opportunities to lead a self-authored
life (i.e., substantive autonomy) requires various material
conditions—beginning with sustenance and shelter and maybe
education and medical care—does not create implications for the
required respect for (formal) autonomy but rather is either part
of the domain of basic (i.e., constitutional) equality or a matter
of democracy, with its general authority over distributive (or
redistributive) matters. Formal autonomy and formal equality
are both basic but do different, non-conflicting work in relation
to a legitimate legal order. In contrast, though hugely significant,
substantive autonomy and substantive equality are largely and
properly subject to variable democratic promotion.
Third, although this formal conception of autonomy
encompasses a person’s choices to self-expressive use of her
resources or speech (through persuasion or provision of
information) to negatively affect another’s realization of her
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aims, it does not encompass various violent, coercive or
manipulative actions as practices that society must respect.
These crucial terms, especially coercion and manipulation,
require careful and quite restricted elaboration. They provide a
10
basis to see “true threats” (maybe as opposed to expressive or
11
warning threats) and manipulative lies as not merely potentially
harmful to the other but as being intrinsically disrespectful of
and, therefore, unprotected interferences with others’ autonomy.
Importantly, these speech practices do not aim to communicate
the speaker’s own views or values, even if in ways that cause
harm to others, but rather attempt to undermine the integrity of
the other person’s decisionmaking authority.
A common objection to an autonomy theory of free speech
takes the following form: No principle of respecting autonomy
can distinguish speech and other behavior. Since constitutional
principles should not and surely do not protect autonomy
generally, speech’s status of being a purposeful exercise of
autonomy cannot provide a sound basis for explaining its
constitutional protection. I would be happy to defend respect for
autonomy on such a broader plane—that represents my
libertarian instinct—though the argument becomes quite
complex. As an example, it could lead to a right to engage in
consensual sex in that this sex, like virtually all intentional
actions, is expressive. Even the sex act’s more narrowly
communicative aspects are often quite obvious. The association
necessarily involved in intercourse provided the First
12
Amendment grounding for Griswold v Connecticut. These
libertarian arguments, however, leave existing constitutional
doctrine far behind. Thus, I do not rely on them here but instead
suggest ways to limit the autonomy claim to speech or
expression.
The most obvious point is positivist—the text of the First
Amendment refers to speech, which might be treated as
extending to expression but which most people would not
10. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 344 (2003) (holding that the First Amendment
allows state to ban “true threats,” in which “the speaker means to communicate a serious
expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence”).
11. Cf. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964) (describing the lie, used as “a
tool” to achieve “ends,” as not protected under “mantle of the Constitution”).
12. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965). Douglas’s opinion for the
Court is best read as resting on association as a “penumbral” aspect of the First
Amendment, with the privacy penumbras of other Amendments being noted merely as
illustrations. See also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003) (holding that a
Texas statute criminalizing homosexual sex acts was unconstitutional).
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consider properly encompassing riding a motorcycle without a
helmet, even if that behavior were considered expressive. Even
if theoretical reasons exist for broader protection, the particular
constitutional order in existence might justify not going further.
A more normative and, to an extent, pragmatic point relates
to the complexity of paternalism. If self-regarding could be
distinguished from other-regarding behavior, as Millian liberals
traditionally tried to do (but see the next paragraph),
paternalism is possibly the main remaining potential justification
for intervention in the first. As a bedrock libertarian principle,
general opposition to paternalism (at least by government as
applied to adults) connects closely to respect for autonomy—a
person making choices about herself. Still, the issue is
complicated and contested. Some arguments for paternalism in
limited circumstances seem plausible. Typically these arguments
become more persuasive the more the unwisely chosen behavior
risks permanent limits on a person’s capacities and the less the
restricted choices seem central to her identity. Empirically, I
suspect such criteria will seldom support paternalistic limits on
speech (which can be important for who a person is but seldom
leave the future person with less capabilities) but give arguable
support for limits on unprotected motorcycle riding or drug
abuse. Add to this distinction a greater suspicion that often
limits on speech are not really motivated by serving the person’s
own good and a plausible practical argument emerges counseling
greater respect for autonomy in relation to speech choices than
for behavior in general. Whether ultimately persuasive, each
point provides a rationale for limiting strong constitutional
respect for autonomy to the context of speech or expression.
Finally, I must observe that some critics of autonomy theory
are simply not careful to understand the implication of generally
protecting (or respecting) autonomy. Their claims often involve
positing an overly broad and untheorized conception of
autonomy. Autonomy as specified here, however, in no sense
covers all a person’s desired behavior—it is fully consistent with
most law, what I have called elsewhere “allocation rules,” which
determine what resources a person has a right to make decisions
13
about or use. Generally, respect for autonomy involves respect
for a person’s choices about herself and, maybe, her resources up
until her choice involves taking choice away from another about

13. Baker, supra note 1, at 227.
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himself or his resources—and, therefore, application of the
concept presupposes some distribution.
This distinction between autonomy and interference with
another cover roughly the same ground that some theorists, as
noted above, tried to find in the distinction between self- or
other-regarding behavior. The problem with their arguments is
that a person’s purportedly self-regarding behavior typically
affects who she is in a manner that subsequently affects her
interactions with others. Consequently, no significant realm of
solely self-regarding behavior remains—the point being that no
one is an island. This consequence casts doubt on designating
any behavior as purely self-regarding, at least in consequences.
Moreover, the distinction does not generate any obvious
protection for speech in that, unlike, say, masturbation, painting,
or mountain climbing, communication is definitionally and
purposefully other-regarding. My suspicion is that theorists’
focus on the fact of harm led them to an attempted distinction
between self- and other-regarding behavior. Their distinction,
however, should have been on how acts cause harm—for
example, by an exercise of autonomy, as formally specified here,
or by violence or coercion. Most expression that anyone wishes
to restrict can be understood to harm some listeners or third
parties, often much more seriously than many forms of criminal
behavior.
The
characteristic
way
speech—certainly
constitutionally protected speech—harms others relates,
however, to why it should be protected as an exercise of the
speaker’s autonomy. Speech harms by being informative or
persuasive—operating through the mind of the other and
thereby gives the other at least the theoretical possibility of
rejecting the message or giving it her own chosen significance.
This feature of how speech achieves its effect is, I believe,
why Thomas Emerson insisted on the distinction between speech
14
and action, according constitutional protection only to behavior
that he believed partook more of the qualities of speech than of
action—though he emphatically would protect some non-verbal
activity as speech and deny protection to some verbal actions.
The distinction he intuited between the behavior he
characterized as speech and that which he characterized as
action related not to the amount of harm each could cause but to
the manner in which it caused harm. If the harm to either the
14. See, e.g., THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
(1971) (surveying free speech law).
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listeners or third parties resulted from audience members’
mental assimilation of the intended meaning that the speaker
honestly expressed, the expressive behavior did not violate the
audience members’ or other third parties’ own formal autonomy.
This feature contrasts with the way other criminalized behavior
(“action” in Emerson’s terminology), including speech
criminalized as fraud, perjury, or manipulative lies or speech
integral to criminal activities, typically does violate or
purposefully undermines other’s ability to make her own
decisions. In Emerson’s analysis, speech or expression is not only
a constitutionally specified aspect of autonomy but it is a
paradigmatic, and an easily specifiable and hugely socially and
personally significant, case of autonomy and should be “fully”
protected by the First Amendment.
II. THE BASIS OF A CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF
FREE SPEECH
A constitutional theory of free speech depends on two
features: a theory of constitutional interpretation and the
specific contours of speech protection that this interpretative
methodology picks out. The great value(s) of speech cannot in
itself explain or identify its constitutional status. The economy
and war have great human significance but we leave regulation
of one and declaration of the other to Congress. An explanation
is needed to explain why—and which—speech to treat
differently. Speech, for instance, might be central for providing
information and argument relevant for the hugely important
tasks of finding truth (compare trials) or reasoned decision
making (compare parliamentary debates, administrative
hearings, or peer reviewed publications) or democratic willformation (compare elections). Still, in each case, these
objectives might be more wisely or more fairly advanced if
speech is intelligently and appropriately regulated. Of course,
different theories of constitutional interpretation can lead to
identical conclusions—as John Rawls pointed out in a different
context related to a possible overlapping consensus of
comprehensive views. I simply outline my key assumptions
concerning interpretation before moving to my claim that the
most appealing approach supports seeing the constitutional
status of free speech as required respect for a person’s autonomy
in her speech choices. Clearly, though, despite my connecting the
topics of proper constitutional interpretation and proper scope

!!BAKER-272-AUTONOMYANDFREESPEECH3.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

260

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

10/17/2011 9:12 AM

[Vol. 27:251

of speech protection, one could agree with my analysis of one
but not the other.
A. INTERPRETATION
Legal practice as we have developed it treats the
constitutional text itself as unchanging (absent Article 5
processes) but it also treats changing judicial interpretations as
having equal status as constitutional law. Interpretative
practices, precedents, and text are equally parts of our accepted
“rule of recognition.” On the basis of acceptance, no part of this
whole is in any sense superior even though only the textual part
is unalterable (except by Article 5 processes)—with alteration
coming from interpretations that we come to accept. These
observations do not, however, yet say anything about how
proper interpretative legal practices should treat—should detract
from or supplement, both of which precedent unquestionably
does—the unchanging text. Nor does it yet explain interpretative
change: when and why particular doctrines are properly rejected.
Much more needs to be said, but my operative premise is
that the Constitution should be understood as an attempt to set
up a legitimate and workable government—or at least that
constitutional interpretation should posit this aim. Constitutional
interpretative and judicial practice often can and, I have
15
argued, should be understood as a conversation, making
periodic enduring gains of insight and less frequent serious
missteps but properly always guided by that aim. Consider,
however, other possibilities.
A straightforward rule of law originalism might claim, first,
that the Constitution is law because those who created it were
“authorized” to create the content and, second, this fact requires
or at least justifies that content remaining fixed until a properly
authorized
process
changes
it.
This
“originalist”
constitutionalism, though, begs key questions. Who has or had
authority to authorize any authority of the framers? What were
the framers authorized to do? What did the framers or ratifiers
actually do? It is hardly obvious that a text should be coercively
binding law for those who do not authorize or accept its
creation—and certainly, most people living in the territory at the
time of adoption were not in the electorate, many of those who
were in the electorate voted “no,” and no one living today

15. C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 272–83 (1989).
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authorized this activity. Something more needs to be said to each
of these categories of people before they have would any reason
to conform to some purported constitutional content.
Hart emphasized that his “rule of recognition” is not,
cannot, be valid but can only be accepted and that it must be so
accepted at least by some officials in order to operate as law.
When do they have grounds to accept it? In the face of the
questions of the last paragraph for which there are no deductive
answers, those who, as it turns out in practice, exercise power
under the constitution have an obligation toward dissenters—
those whom they ask to obey—to show why the
legal/constitutional order is one that the dissenters should or at
least reasonably could accept. Without those exercising power
being convinced that they have made this showing, they have no
good faith basis to claim that dissenters have an obligation to
obey. Thus, the conversational aim of constitutional law (or
interpretation) should be agreement on the constitution’s
acceptability even if in the real world that agreement should not
16
be predicted. Proper interpretation takes this as its orienting
aim.
This understanding of the interpretative obligation of
current officials would not see those original framers as
authorized to create simply any constitution that a ratifying
majority accepts. That earlier majority had no inherent authority
to impose on others. Rather these officials should see those
framers as authorized to create—or as aiming to create—a
workable and legitimate legal order that those creators and their
empowered successors stand ready to defend as providing a
constitutional framework that those who dissent can and should
accept. If this is the nature and extent of the framers’ authority,
they would be unreasonable to think that their own insights
inevitably provide all the right answers to all questions of
constitutional design. Rather, since these right answers were
their only proper aim, the view that can be best attributed to
them is that they saw themselves as making a first stab at an
answer, an initial move that leaves this issue of legitimacy
(agreeability) and hence of content continually on the table.
Their more modest but reasonable self-understanding is that
their efforts initiated the conversation—with Article 5 not so

16. Below I give reasons not to expect symmetry. What is required of those who
exercise power to justify their coercive acts is not enough to make obedience obligatory
for those who dissent.
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much the only basis for change but rather a power of the
populace to redirect the conversation if they conclude that it has
gone too far off-track.
The merits or demerits of our actual constitutional order are
surely contestable, but clearly the constitutional order that
people historically did create—the rule of recognition that
officials and the public generally have accepted—treats these
further judicial interpretative activities, often guided by the aim
to create a workable and legitimate constitution, as part of our
open-textured rule of recognition. Any different originalist claim
about the place or status of constitutional interpretation
represents advocacy, based on plausible but ultimately (I think)
unpersuasive normative assumptions, for creating a different,
purportedly desirable, but in this country, rejected rule of
17
recognition. Such originalist claims do not correspond to what
dominant authorities now or in the past have accepted as
constitutional law. Consequently, the best interpretation and
“our” existing constitutional interpretations of the First
Amendment should and usually do aim at content necessary—
but given the general propriety of democratic choice, no more
than the content necessary—for the legitimacy of the legal order.
18

B. LEGITIMACY
Law purports to be authoritative in creating a framework
for interaction in society—or, as Hart emphasized in his path
breaking critique of Austin’s positivism, law purports to
empower and obligate, not merely oblige people. The question
is: what conditions must the legal order meet to justify its claim
to create real obligations—or to be legitimate? Can any legal
process or legal content (substance) justify use of otherwise
immoral force or coercion to enforce the law? Many answers
have been advanced, some I think overtly unpersuasive despite
impressive pedigrees (Hobbesian answers, for example).
Moreover, many answers are overlapping, possibly telling part of
the story or pointing to relevant considerations. Two proposed
answers, however, are particularly relevant for what they suggest
17. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Precedent-Based Constitutional
Adjudication, Acceptance, and the Rule of Recognition, in MATTHEW ADLER &
KENNETH EINAR HIMMA, THE RULE OF RECOGNITION AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION
47, 50–55 (2009) (arguing that Article VI does not exhaust the practice of recognition).
18. This section overtly uses, maybe not always felicitously, concepts drawn without
citation from various theorists including Kant, Scanlon, Habermas, and Michelman as
well as my own work.
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about a constitutional theory of free speech. I argue the first is
not so much wrong as inadequate and the second, going beyond
the first, is more powerful in showing what the state needs to
offer in asserting that a person should accept the legal order as
obligatory and providing a proper basis for understanding free
speech. Of course, these broad issues cannot be fully dealt with
here. I offer only an outline showing a direction that discussion
could follow.
Democracy is one answer. Not only does social life
necessarily require behavioral norms but a reasonable argument
is that at least many of these norms achieve their ends much
better if they are authoritative and enforced in the manner
described as a legal order. There will always be dissent to the
favored norms. All specifications of legal rules inevitably
produce losers, those who claim other rules would be better. A
democratic process, however, in one sense “equally” respects
people as properly having a “say” in the rules they live under.
(Though “equally” only in a formal sense of “voice”—in another
way, democracy gives those in the majority more than it gives
losers whose objections potentially have no effect on resulting
norms.) On this ground, democracy is arguably the best that can
be done, given the impossibility (or, at least, lack of pragmatic
appeal) of anarchic or completely voluntaristic social life, for
justifying the legitimacy of the social order. The pay-off for the
First Amendment is the possibility that a theory of democracy
can ground a theory of free speech.
Three immediate problems with this answer are: (i) The
proper conception of democracy needs specification. (ii) The
specification cannot be merely sociological or historical but must
rely on moral or ethical considerations. (iii) Both the status and
source of these moral considerations needs explication.
Consideration of these problems, taken up in turn, provides, I
believe, one route to a preferable and richer theory.
Obviously, any democratic theory of a constitutional status
for free speech must rely on a particular conception of
democracy. For example, constitutional democracy could make
the legitimacy of majority decision-making depend on the
process not making any decisions violating particular substantive
rights—rights which might include some form of voice within the
process or which might include legal respect for individuals’
general authority to make autonomous speech choices. Many
believe that something like the second conception of democracy
is accepted in the United States and many other constitutional
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democracies. Why is not this conception, rather than the first
theory that sees democracy more purely procedurally and that
gives majority rule a more expansive authority to restrict at least
non-political speech, the better theory of democracy? The issue
is not definitional—some substantive argument must be given.
A procedural theory that asserts that democracy implies
authority to decide any question by “majoritarian processes,”
whatever these processes are, is overtly question begging. Why
accept a mere procedural theory? And how does one determine
and why should one accept specific majoritarian processes? Even
if a procedural conception were favored, logically it requires
freedom (of speech) only to propose an issue for democratic
vote. After certain proposals are made, for example, after a
proposal to eliminate an existing ban of talking about a
particular issue, procedure rules could require an immediate
“call of the question.” This procedural view presumably allows
majoritarian decisions to prohibit or regulate any speech,
including public discourse—except for guaranteeing the right of
legislators to propose and then vote, maybe immediately, on
proposals to repeal an existing restriction. (Compare Robert’s
Rules on non-debatable motions.) Limits on speech—for
example, prohibitions on speech supporting communist or Nazi
parties or agendas or, within an electoral campaign, on the use of
music jingles, “excessive” expenditures, certain promises of
political candidates related to their proposed job performance,
or announcements by a (judicial) candidate of her views on
19
matters which may come before her if elected —could be
explained either on grounds of hypothesized objectionable
qualities of the prohibited speech or as ways to improve
democratic deliberation. These restrictions would embody
democratic decision making when adopted. Each limit on
speech, however, conflicts with other procedural interpretations
of democracy. In other words, a commitment to democracy does
not tell whether any significant guarantee of free political (or
non-political) speech should exist.
If a procedural conception of democracy provides a basis
for a free speech guarantee, it could provide the guarantee with
either of at least two justifications, which lead to different
19. The first two in this list exist in some democratic countries. Versions of the last
three were enacted here but then struck down by the Court. Republican Party of Minn. v.
White, 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002) (judicial candidate announcements); Brown v. Hartlage,
456 U.S. 46, 61 (1982) (campaign promises); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 39–60 (1976)
(campaign expenditures).
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protections. Meiklejohn is normally seen as offering the first,
apparently valuing free speech simply for its instrumentalist
contribution to deliberation: “What is essential is not that
everyone shall speak, but that everything worth saying shall be
20
said.” This instrumental argument, though restricted to the
political sphere, has all the weaknesses of any marketplace of
ideas theory and I will put it aside—as arguably Meiklejohn
himself did when he referred to, “the sheer stupidity of the
policies of this nation,” a stupidity that speaks against the
21
argument. The alternative, also offered by Meiklejohn, is
virtually definitional, purportedly following deductively from the
22
people’s decision to “govern themselves.” The appeal of this
interpretation of democracy as deductively including individual
rights to engage in speech, at least in the public sphere, follows
most obviously from—I believe embodies—respect for the
individual as an agent, as an autonomous being. This valuebased interpretation of democracy does not, however, show
whether there are proper limits on democracy but certainly
raises the possibility that limits should reflect the same values as
the justification.
Only value commitments—not abstract logic, deduction,
and certainly not mere facts such as history, even “our”
interpreted history or information about “our” framers—can
require a particular connection between democracy and free
speech. The obvious value premise that requires that democracy
take a form that protects people’s political speech is a principle
that requires respect for citizen’s autonomy within the law
making process—that views them as agents with proper claims to
self-determination as well as having their interest in selfrealization. This respect not only gives reason to interpret
democracy as including speech freedom but provides a ground to
value democracy—two conclusions following from the value of
respecting their claims for self-determination.
The problem for this argument, however, is that it provides
no obvious reason to limit this respect for self-government to
collective self-governing—the political sphere—as opposed to
20. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 26 (1960). See BAKER, supra note 15 (discussing the tension in
Meiklejohn between the two theories). This first argument is the one Robert Post
identifies as Meiklejohn’s Mistake. ROBERT POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS 268–89
(1995).
21. Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT.
REV. 245, 263.
22. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 20, at 5.
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self-governing also within private spheres. Post rightly notes that
we might be only (or differently) committed to collective but not
23
individual self-determination, but I wonder how that distinction
is justified (or attributed to Americans). I conjecture that the
two are so intrinsically intertwined that neither can really be
guaranteed without the other, hence Habermas’s suggestion
about the co-originality of public and private autonomy. I also
suspect that most people in their lives rebel more at limits on
their individual (private) than their political (public) autonomy.
In any event, the premise of respect for self-determination,
which most plausibly justifies protection of political speech,
leads to the second answer to the question of legitimacy: a
legitimate legal order must fully respect (among other things,
e.g. equality) both individual and collective autonomy—both
non-political and political speech.
This last claim represents the following reasoning. Grant the
claim that a mandated respect for autonomy provides the best
argument for a conception of democracy whose meaning
includes a guarantee of political speech freedom. What more can
be said for this conception of democracy, attributed autonomy,
and their respective extent and relationship? The legal order
potentially contributes greatly to human actors achieving both
individual and collective projects. The legal choices that
contribute to projects of either sort inevitably produce losers
who would have benefitted more from other choices. This
“inevitability” suggests that the existence of losers cannot itself
be an objection to the resulting order. Still, the regrettable fact
of losers leaves open whether any principles support claims to
limit the collective projects or collective means that are to their
24
disadvantage. The propriety of the legal order’s promotion of
selected conceptions of the good, for example, does not imply
that an aim of making people losers can be a proper project, a
proper basis of law. If the moral value of democracy lies (in part)
in its contribution to people’s political autonomy in pursuit of
their democratically chosen projects—with its implicit premise
that it values these people as autonomous—democracy’s
authority should be limited by this same value. Given this value,
democracy (or law) should not, therefore, be authorized to enact
23. Post, supra note 1, at 626–27.
24. I pursue this type of reasoning to derive three principles that I argue would be
more rational to choose within Rawls’s original position than either the difference
principle or restricted utility, the primary alternative that he considered. Baker, supra
note 7, at 203–04.
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laws that disrespect, that are premised on the propriety of
denying, a person’s autonomy (or, though less relevant here, her
equality and maybe her dignity). This conclusion should then
guide interpretation of the constitutional guarantee of free
speech. It gives equal status to protecting speech as a part of
personal, individual self-government and as an aspect of her
participation in collective self-government.
The above is the argument for an autonomy interpretation
of free speech working out from a commitment to democracy.
What is the more direct affirmative argument? People’s capacity
to embody their values in law enables them to pursue their
values collectively and to create a favored world. But in contrast
to voluntary associations, the impermissibility of escape from
law’s coercive reach makes its propriety subject to challenge by
dissenters given the positive value of this capacity for selfdetermination. Consent—or, better, agreement or selfauthorship—might solve this legitimacy question. Kantian moral
theory might argue that a person should be governed only by
laws that she gives—or, with considerable loss of justificatory
force, only by law that she should or, maybe, could give herself,
or could not reasonably reject giving to herself. Inevitably, in any
actual legal order some will (certainly might) dissent—say “no”
to a given law or even to the entire “constitutional” lawmaking
practice. For this rejection to disable the use of law would
effectively give the dissenter, gives minorities, power over
others, which is morally problematic. For this reason, the most
that moral theory should expect of the majority, those prepared
to back their law with force, is that they propose only laws or
projects for which they can in good faith give reasons to the
dissenter for why she could and, the majority argues, should
accept these laws. This reduced requirement is an implicit
premise of discourse, that is, of communicative action, a process
by which people seek agreement and crucially, is not limited to
public discourse, but also includes private discussion such as
ones in which a group of friends try to decide where to go to
25
dinner. It cannot be found as implicit in a solipsistic notion of
reason, of the categorical imperative, or an isolated individual’s
autonomy. It looks instead to the nature of our unavoidable
commitments within communicative action rather than to either

25. For a brief discussion, see JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACT AND NORMS:
CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 1–9 (William
Rehg trans., 1996).
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agreement or to an absence of reasonable rejectability. Still,
this limitation on proposals does seem to rule out certain
proposals—such as those that positively value, as opposed to
recognizing the inevitability, that some will disagree and become
losers. And it rules out those that endorse limits on the
autonomy of some as the means to advance proper ends. Thus,
this discourse requirement leads to a “liberal” value of toleration
of autonomy, not neutrality between conceptions of the good.
Laws inevitably support some people’s substantive autonomy
over that of others, but respect for formal autonomy rules out an
affirmative purpose of restricting people’s substantive
autonomy. On this view, legitimacy requires that the legal order
not adopt laws restricting individuals’ expressive freedom either
as an end or a purposeful means.
Speech sometimes contributes to the search for truth, to
democracy, and to substantive autonomy. Unlike these
unpersuasive instrumentalist justifications of constitutional
speech freedom, here the argument for toleration reflects a
formal, but not a substantive, conception of speech autonomy.
People cannot be expected to accept collective proposals—
laws—that value restricting their own chosen expression. In
contrast, everyone could value many particular collective
projects even if these projects leave people with varying and,
sometimes, at least from their own point of view, inadequate
speech opportunities.
One final caveat needs emphasis. The central claim is not
that a legal order’s respect for each person’s autonomy
(especially, her expressive freedom) combined with respect for
each person’s equality, dignity, and humanity suffices to leave
each person unable to reasonably reject the legitimacy of
particular laws or even of the legal order as a whole. Nonrejectability is fine as a goal—an aim always implicit in dialogue,
in communicative action—but nothing said above shows that it
can be achieved. Some people—the religious devotee, for
example—can have good reason to reject even the legal order
that meets requirements of respect for people’s formal
autonomy (and equality). The dialogic situation has two poles—
the person making a proposal and the person who can say either
“yes” or “no.” There is no reason to assume that the first
person’s meeting the requirements placed on her means that the
26. C. Edwin Baker, Basic Equality: Grounded Universal Commitments (2008)
(unpublished manuscript).
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second will have reason to respond as hoped. This distinction
has, for example, huge implications for a theory of civil
disobedience. Rejectability may justify an individual in violating
a law. The concern here, however, has only been with the
obligations placed on the lawgiver. The claim is that a legal order
cannot reasonably claim legitimacy without (among other
requirements) respecting people’s autonomy.
If this criterion of legitimacy is right (obviously the
argument here is too summary), democracy is not the starting
point, providing a basis for the constitutional status of free
speech. Rather law’s aspiration to legitimacy grounds both a
properly expansive democracy and limits on democracy (in
behalf of respecting autonomy, equality, etc.).
Is constitutional interpretation’s reliance on moral theory
27
regrettable? Avoidable? Moral theory—and particularly this
favorable evaluation of autonomy—is wildly contested and its
controversial nature might be grounds to seek to avoid it.
Instead, maybe free speech represents simply “our” overlapping
consensus on a democratic faith, possibly a uniquely American
faith given our courts’ divergence from an international
consensus on prohibiting hate speech and varying responses to
other speech issues. The two problems are obvious. First, the
laws Congress (and individual states) pass limiting political (and
non-political) speech suggest that “our” consensus is not so
clear. When the Supreme Court strikes down these laws, it must
rely on considerations less sociological than “our” conception of
democracy. When Congress or a state violates the Court’s
conception of free speech (or of democracy), the Court implicitly
claims that its conception is more justifiable—not more
descriptive—than the legislators’. Second, as a narrow argument
for a political speech theory, reliance only on the Supreme
Court’s enunciation of “our conception” must still make room
for evidence discussed in Part III that the Court’s theory is much
broader. Inevitably, if only implicitly, legal argument must rely
on moral commitments and these point to the autonomy theory
of free speech.
27. Vince Blasi’s response to Post and James Weinstein in the Virginia Law Review
symposium on the relationship between democracy and First Amendment theory
implicitly raises these questions. See Vincent Blasi, Democratic Participation and the
Freedom of Speech: A Response to Post and Weinstein, 97 VA. L. REV. 531 (2011).
Obviously, lawyers and judges normally and probably wisely avoid explicit engagement
with moral philosophy. That fact does not deny, however, that they necessarily rely on
normative premises and, if so, that these should be evaluated and criticized on the basis
of their persuasiveness.
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III. DOCTRINAL FIT AND REFLECTIVE EQUILIBRIUM
The crucible of litigation, social movements, and scholarly
debate have left us with a robust, though somewhat uneven, First
Amendment doctrine that, I believe, overall is best justified by
the autonomy theory offered above. Still, academic thought
sinks to its lowest depths when its methodological ambition is to
be an apologist for the status quo. The measure of the appeal of
a First Amendment theory should not be the extent that it
conforms to existing doctrine but the quality of its explanation of
those aspects of existing doctrine that should be approved and,
while linking meaningfully to existing constitutional discourse,
the persuasiveness of its critique of aspects of doctrine that
should be rejected. Though some scholars see their task to
explain the at least legal correctness of Dred Scott, Plessy,
28
Lochner, or more relevant to us, Dennis, at least at the time
they were decided, with their task and theory requiring change
as doctrine twists and turns, my hope is that I would have been
one who, at the time of these decisions, would offer a legal
critique, as the dissenters on the Court attempted, in addition to
a political critique. With this criterion in mind, I consider
doctrinal areas that the autonomy theory does better than some
or all other theories in justifying and other areas where its merit
lies in the critique it offers.
Flag Salute. The poster child of autonomy theory is the
Court’s opinion in Barnette, which forwent reliance of the
religion clauses and gave a ringing endorsement of the school
children’s right to abstain from saluting the flag on the basis of
First Amendment protected liberty. The Court emphasized the
child’s liberty, not political debate nor any marketplace of ideas.
The political order received attention primarily in the Court’s
recognition that its legitimacy depends on this limitation—that
assuring secure rights will “[make] us feel safe to live under [a
strong government],” while the compelled flag salute “invades
the sphere of intellect and spirit,” involving the “coercive
elimination of dissent” that ends only in “the unanimity of the

28. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 516–17 (1951) (holding that the Smith
Act to prevent the formation of a Communist Party does not violate the First
Amendment). Interestingly, Frankfurter, in his remark that the revolutionary advocacy
involved in the case “ranks low” on any scale of first amendment values, id. at 544
(Frankfurter, J., concurring), effectively restated the democratic speech theory of
Learned Hand from Masses Publ’g Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535, 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1917),
denying that counseling law violation can be part of democratic public opinion.
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29

graveyard.” In dissent, Justice Frankfurter, distancing himself
from the majority’s emphasis on liberty, essentially invoked
democratic discourse in explaining that he would vote for the
children if the state had in any way restrained their or their
parents’ speech repudiating the flag salute and criticizing the
compulsion. Frankfurter emphasized that the required salute did
not impede the children’s freedom to participate in or to place
any views into political discourse—in fact, he hypothesized that
prior compulsion might enhance the salience of any subsequent
30
critical expression. But the majority rested on different
grounds. Compulsion directly abridged children’s liberty—their
expressive autonomy.
Art and Music. Abstract art and compositional music,
found, for example, in the Court’s dicta referring to Jackson
31
Pollock and Arnold Schöenberg’s music, require a stretch to
justify as political speech or truth propositions to test in a
marketplace of ideas. Sure, all aesthetic experiences, like all
experiences generally, can affect who a person is, how she sees
the world, and thereby affect her values, politics, and notions of
32
truth. Such explanations for their relevance to the political
29. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 636, 641, 642 (1943).
30. See id. at 664. The majority of the Court made clear that, except for the
legitimate strength of the state interest (they could teach patriotism by persuasion),
nothing turned on the political or public discourse salience of the salute. It was a similar
interest in liberty not to have to bow and get permission from the state, not the
opportunity to participate in public discourse, that Justice Stevens emphasized in
Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y v. Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 169 (2002). Similarly, in
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 713 n.10 (1977), the Court explicitly rejected reliance
on the possible symbolic speech argument that covering the motto on the license plate
would make Maynard’s act a communication within public discourse.
31. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian, & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 569
(1995).
32. Clearly contrary to existing doctrine, which belies any hope for his political
participation theory to be descriptive of existing doctrine, Jim Weinstein’s suggestion
that much speech should be protected as an aspect of privacy or liberty under the due
process clause is reminiscent of Meiklejohn’s approach. See James Weinstein,
Participatory Democracy as the Basis of American Free Speech Doctrine: A Reply, 97 VA.
L. REV. 633, 656 ( 2011). Also, reminiscent is the arguable collapse of the bite of
Meiklejohn’s theory, when in the face of criticism for the potential political relevance of
whole categories of speech that he seemed to exclude, he expanded his category of
democratic relevant content. Compare Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Book Review 62 HARV. L.
REV. 891 (1949) (reviewing ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH: AND ITS
RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948)) (criticizing Meiklejohn’s expansive conception of the First Amendment), with Meiklejohn, supra note 21, at 255 (“[The First
Amendment] is concerned, not with a private right, but with a public power, a
governmental responsibility.”) Kitchen, bedroom and front door “private” speech can
contribute to democracy, of course. But their protection should not depend on any such
connection. Once Weinstein grants First Amendment protection to interfamilial or
intimate speech exclusively because it is part of “democratic discourse,” however, the
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sphere or to a marketplace of ideas do not, however, distinguish
them from, say, hiking in a wilderness area, cooperation in a
barn raising, or engaging in a criminal enterprise. Though Post
might treat these as part of public discourse that affects the
public opinion, which democratic government should reflect, this
is seldom the aim of the communication and this ground for
protection surely feels far from the heart of why most people
engage in these forms of expression or why they should be
protected. In contrast, the liberty of the creators or performers
and their audiences is clearly at stake and, in a free society,
should be legally respected.
Commercial Speech. Characterization of commercial speech
provides a clear battle ground for free speech theories.
Information or advice in commercial advertisements can in
principle make the same contribution as can any other form of
speech either to a marketplace of ideas or to the listener’s
substantive autonomy. Protection, as Martin Redish showed
33
long ago, follows. This speech’s potential contribution to
democratic self-government is somewhat more complicated. If
the democratic discourse theory focuses on the information
potentially relevant to or that can affect self-government,
protection again follows as Redish and then, beginning in
34
Virginia Board, the Court recognized. If, however, democratic
discourse focuses on citizens’ participation in the public sphere
or her aim to contribute to public opinion, denial of
constitutional protection would follow. Democratic legitimacy
involves empowering citizen governors, not commercial entities.
This second democratic argument, however, is essentially a
restricted autonomy-based theory—one limited to the political
sphere.
From a (formal) autonomy theory, there are at least three—
though contestable—arguments to deny protection to
commercial speech. First, to the extent the “free” market works
as Karl Marx, Max Weber, and modern conservative economists
claim, its competitive dynamics compel market participants to
seek profit maximization (and, some market apologists wrongly
category has lost power to discriminate between protected and unprotected speech.
33. Martin H. Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial
Speech and the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429, 432 (1971)
(arguing that some traditionally protected speech that happens to be profit-making is
denied protection).
34. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumers Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 773 (1976) (holding that commercial speech by pharmacists advertising prescription
prices was not outside the protection of the First Amendment).
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assert, efficient results). In Jurgen Habermas’ terminology, in
this “system realm,” money, not communicative action, provides
the steering mechanism. The structural compulsion of the
market means that neither liberty nor autonomy is at stake, at
least to the extent this sphere works according to its ideal.
(Autonomy may exist in respect to a person’s choice of the
entity for which to work—but not the entity’s behavior.) Some
commentators assert that the same is true in other “spheres.”
For example, the pressure to get elected is said to control
politicians’ speech. However, unlike the market, for which
profitability and purported consequential efficiency provide the
35
realm’s regulative ideals, the regulative ideal of the political
sphere is for candidates to be persuasive about values actually
held—and much of the structure of the political in any broad
sense makes central the persuasive, expressive quality of “grassroots” speech.
Second, a legally constituted business entity that communicates or sponsors speech—it typically pays for and may deduct
the cost of the speech as a business—is a legally constructed,
instrumentally valued, artificial entity. Although defensible
policies often grant these entities various freedoms, including
some communicative freedom, the moral/constitutional
autonomy-based justification for protecting speech of flesh and
blood people is simply not at stake here.
Third, market exchanges use property as power. Both
parties use their property, money or labor not to persuade the
other about values, attitudes, desirable associations, or facts
about the world but directly to change the other’s situation in
order to get the other party to do something she otherwise
would not want to do—give the speaker her money, property, or
service. This description essentially distinguishes the
(instrumentalist) exchange and (substantive) use value of
property. This instrumental aspect contrasts with speech (and
voluntary associations) that often seek to influence other’s
behavior but by influencing her understanding of her reasons,
changing her beliefs, or by giving her new associational
opportunities without seeking or obtaining any behavior that she
would prefer to skip. The instrumental value that a listener
places in her responsiveness to the persuasiveness of commercial

35. Seana Shiffrin has recently raised the question of whether we should accept the
economists’ and the Weberians’ regulative ideal of the market—a point that raises issues
I put aside here.
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speech or a gun to her head contrasts to the substantive or
solidarity value a listener places in her response to a solicitation
for contribution. In the second circumstance, but not the first,
the listener comes to value the recipient having that with which
she parts. And the speaker in the charitable solicitation seeks to
persuade the listener on agreement in values while in the
commercial speech or gun case only seeks behavior that the
listener now instrumentally values because of how the speaker
has changed her options. Though a society should provide
people with various opportunities to engage in mutual exercises
of power, these exercises of power should always be subject to
collective (legislative) control. Here, the value of liberty or
autonomy is simply not at stake—which is probably why John
Stuart Mill explained that any argument for free trade rested on
different premises than the argument for liberty and why he was
more ready to accept regulation of commercial promotional
36
speech than other speech.
Each of these points about commercial speech depend on
controversial analyses—which I have taken pains to defend
37
elsewhere —but the essential claim is the one made by the
dissent in Bellotti (and subsequently adopted by the majority in
Austin): “[W]hat some have considered to be the principal
function of the First Amendment, the use of communication as a
means of self-expression, self-realization, and self-fulfillment, is
not at all furthered by corporate speech. It is clear that the
communications of profitmaking corporations . . . do not
38
represent a manifestation of individual freedom or choice.”
Press. The arguments to deny protection to the speech of
commercial entities immediately put into question the status of
the press, which today is largely constituted by large marketoriented entities. My autonomy argument seeks to justify
individuals’ speech freedom. A full interpretation of the First
Amendment must consider whether the press clause should have
an independent meaning. History going back to the country’s
founding suggests that it should and more specifically that its
36. See generally JOHN STUART MILL, On Liberty, ch. 5, in MILL 41, 115 (Alan
Ryan ed., 1997) (discussing trade policies and communication).
37. C. Edwin Baker, The First Amendment and Commercial Speech, 84 IND. L.J.
981, 981–85, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1019264; BAKER, supra note 15, at 194–
224. See generally Baker, supra note 3.
38. First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 804–05 (1978) (White, J.,
dissenting); see also Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990)
(distinguishing media corporations from other corporations because of the nature of
media communications).
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protection should relate broadly to its instrumental democratic
39
roles. Elsewhere I have argued that, in place after place,
existing judicial doctrine is incoherent without the assumption
40
that the press clause has an independent meaning. This
independent meaning explains holdings giving substantially
different speech rights to media corporations than to other
corporations. It explains the Court’s approval of limits on nonpress corporations’ speech rights that would be inconceivable if
applied (and, therefore, for which there has been no attempt to
apply) to press entities. Laws restrict non-press businesses’
speech in order to protect privacy, to stop unauthorized use of
people’s image, and to prevent professional malpractice—all in
ways inapplicable to the press. Lower courts have long granted
journalists whose confidential sources might be exposed, but not
individuals, some protection from compelled testimony. On the
other hand, courts have upheld obligations for newspapers,
broadcasters, and cable, but not for individuals, to carry speech
mandated by the government. Though never thoroughly
rationalized, limits on content discrimination apply differently
and on basis of different rationales to the press than to
individuals on the street corner. These points only begin to note
the “specialness” of the press clause.
The press’s role in democratic discourse—or, more broadly,
its role of being an independent (of government) originator or
reporter of information and vision—justifies, I have argued, the
separate constitutional significance of the press and the
differences between its treatment and the treatment of either
individuals or other corporations. This different and
instrumental basis for protection generally does not justify less
(or more) affirmative speech rights for the media than for
41
individuals. It does, however, justify some forms of special
39. See especially David A. Anderson, The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L.
REV. 455 (1983) (describing the history and scholarship of the Press Clause). Although
Vincent Blasi does not read the historical evidence he marshaled in defense of the
checking function to support the view that it is particularly the press that is valued for its
potential performance of this checking function, I think the evidence he marshaled
supports such a view. See Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory,
1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 521 (1977).
40. See generally C. Edwin Baker, The Independent Significance of the Press Clause
Under Existing Law, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 955 (2007). The normative theory for this view
of the press is given in BAKER, supra note 15, at 225–71. See also C. EDWIN BAKER,
MEDIA, MARKETS, AND DEMOCRACY 193–214 (2002) (discussing the implications of
interpretations of the Press Clause); C. Edwin Baker, Turner Broadcasting: ContentBased Regulation of Persons and Presses, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 57 (describing the decision
in Turner Broadcasting v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994)).
41. But see C. Edwin Baker, First Amendment Limits on Copyright, 55 VAND. L.
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protections for the press as an institution and allows, arguably
calls for, some special structural regulation of the press that have
no coherent application to individuals. (For example, since the
adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment, we do not allow other
than self-ownership rules for individuals.)
Obscenity.
Obscenity
doctrine
presents
another
battleground. In Roth, Brennan indicated that the First
Amendment did not protect obscenity but fully protected “all
42
ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance.”
Brennan ignored Douglas’s later libertarian observation that
obscene material clearly had importance to some people (e.g., its
43
purchasers), presumably because his concern was “importance”
within a marketplace of ideas. Having “any” such value, he
subsequently explained, was key to the conceptual basis of that
approach. But Brennan ultimately abandoned the Roth
approach and rejected the majority’s “balancing” approach in
44
Paris Adult Theatre. Although he explicitly relied on the
ground that regulation of obscenity cannot avoid constitutionally
intolerable vagueness, in a footnote Brennan implicitly offered a
45
liberty or autonomy theory that paralleled Douglas’ approach.
Brennan indicated that he now accepted the earlier decision in
Stanley v. Georgia, which he originally had not joined, possibly
because it made little sense to give First Amendment (as
opposed, maybe to Fourth Amendment) protection to
possession within the home of otherwise unprotected material.
Now his reasoning referred broadly to the objectionable nature
of regulating speech involving “willing adult[s],” virtually code
words for a liberty approach, and “the right to exercise
‘autonomous control over the development and expression of
46
one’s intellect, tastes, and personality.’” For individual
autonomy, protection does make sense. Essentially, in Roth, his
rejection of protection for obscenity was rooted in its lack of role
in any search for truth—though it could have equally well been

REV 891, 899 (2002) (noting some differences under the theory advanced here and noting
that these differences conform to early American copyright law—and hence, maybe to
original intent—and are still reflected in existing law).
42. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
43. Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 489–90 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
44. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 96–98, 97 (1973) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
45. Id. at 85 n.9.
46. Id. (quoting Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 211 (1973)).
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for its lack of role in public discourse. When he changed, he
47
highlighted the relevance of obscenity for individual autonomy.
In short, existing doctrine denies protection to obscenity—
although given widespread availability at newsstands in most
cities and everywhere on the internet of material hard not to
describe as hard core, this quixotic denial of protection seems
increasingly belabored outside the area of child pornography,
where the constitutionally accepted evil is not obscene content
but abuse involved in production. Still, obscenity remains a
theoretically contentious area where surely different theories are
better judged by their own appeal than by their conformity with
current doctrine. Here, Brennan’s original reasoning, which has
some coherence from a marketplace of ideas perspective, denies
protection. So do most political speech theories, though not
because pornography is without political effect. Like many
activities or experiences, its effect reflects its potential to change
the person who partakes, not its participation in public
discourse—points forcefully made by MacKinnon in her critique
48
of the dominant marketplace of ideas paradigm. From an
autonomy perspective, the issue is easy, at least if one adds that
even commercial production can be protected under the press
clause. For the reasons Brennan eventually gives, obscenity
should be protected
Speech and Secrecy. Given their instrumentalism, any
substantive autonomy theory and many versions of marketplace
of ideas theory should have trouble distinguishing in principle
the government keeping specified information secret and its
prohibiting communication of that specified information in order
to keep it unknown. Both interfere equally with listeners’
substantive autonomy. Both serve roughly the same government
purposes. Thus, it might seem that either both government acts
should be permissible or, if sufficient weight is placed on the
information’s contribution to actors’ substantive autonomy or
their search for truth or for political or other wisdom, both
should be impermissible. Judicial doctrine, however, clearly
rejects this symmetry. The Court, sometimes unanimously,
47. Though a subject for a different paper, this represents a more general move
within Brennan’s free speech thinking, illustrated by his statement: “[F]reedom of
expression is made inviolate by the First Amendment.” Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v.
Va., 448 US 555, 585 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
48. CATHARINE MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS (1993) (discussing defamation and
discrimination, racial and sexual harassment, and equality and speech). But see C. Edwin
Baker, Of Course, More Than Words, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1181 (1994) (disputing the
“theories or speech and equality that MacKinnon offers in ONLY WORDS”).
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invalidates limits on publication of information that the
49
government can properly keep secret. Although difficult to
explain on grounds of the substantive value of the information to
people, this distinction follows easily from speakers’ (or the
press’s) formal freedom to say whatever they choose (given their
knowledge or imagination). The point is that government often
has legitimate—important, maybe even compelling—ends but
can pursue these only by means that do not violate people’s
autonomy, or the press’s freedom, in respect to speech.
Content Discrimination. Hornbook doctrine exhibits
confusion over and routinely overstates the force of the doctrinal
bar on content discrimination (and if, as I believe, Justice
50
Kennedy is right, understates its proper force where it is
properly applicable). Of course, no proponent of the doctrine
imagines that it provides an objection to suppressing content
which First Amendment theory does not identify as covered
51
speech. Though disagreement exists over whether the First
Amendment should protect for incitement to crime, obscenity,
negligently false defamatory statements, and fighting words,
once a “no” answer is given, the reasons to deny protection
justify bans on the unprotected content. Still, standard versions
of the doctrinal bar on content discrimination clearly create
problems for any theory that claims heightened protection for
political speech over non-political speech.
The logic of autonomy theory, however, can be seen in
52
Chicago Police Department v. Mosley, the case routinely cited
for establishing the no content discrimination doctrine—
although any careful observer would find the doctrine rooted in
49. E.g., Landmark Commc’ns, Inc. v. Va., 435 U.S. 829, 845 (1978). The Court has
also held that, although the state can keep certain information secret, once the state
makes it publicly available or the press learns it independently, the state cannot stop its
further communication. See, e.g., Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989) (name of rape
victim); Smith v. Daily Mail Pub. Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979) (identity of alleged juvenile
delinquent); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 US 469 (1975) (name of rape victim).
50. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd, 502 U.S.
105, 123–28 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
51. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 396–96 (1992) (invalidating a city
ordinance prohibiting bias-motivated disorderly conduct) may appear to contradict this
claim, but it does not if it is seen, as it should, as an application of the O’Brien doctrine,
which allows invalidating a law or its application if it restricts unprotected expressive
conduct when the reason for the restriction must be understood as aiming at suppressing
protected expression. Cf. United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 318–19 (1990) (holding
that the Flag Burning Act violates the First Amendment). Then Scalia’s reasoning makes
sense but he misapplied it in R.A.V. while the Court properly applied it in Va. v. Black,
538 U.S. 343, 367–68 (2003).
52. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
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decisions from the 1930s and 1940s when the Court rejected
permit requirements not constrained by clear standards and
effectively identified the evil as potential of content
discrimination by the local officials. Mosley offered three
arguments. First, it referred to the importance of government
neutrality, presumably within a marketplace of ideas. A
requirement of neutrality cannot explain First Amendment
mandates. It would rule out huge, constant governmental
expenditures on speech and publications that promote its views
on how issues should be resolved and what values ought to
obtain. The Court offers approval of the government trying, by
persuasion or school curriculum, to favor patriotism and to
inculcate community values. More fundamentally, the whole
legal structure inherently favors some views over others, which
suggests that neutrality cannot be a standard or even a goal—
without an appropriate baseline from which no views would be
advantaged.
Second, the Court objected somewhat more plausibly to
restrictions of speech on the basis of content that leaves open the
possible permissibility of promotion of various viewpoints.
According to the Court, “[T]he First Amendment means that
government has no power to restrict expression because of its
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content. . . . [It] may
not grant the use of a forum to people whose views it finds
acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to express less favored
53
or more controversial views.” Maybe (though only on various
unrealistic assumptions) the marketplace of ideas eventually
leads to what is true or wise, maybe public opinion is wise or at
least appropriate, as long as no speech is suppressed by
government (as opposed to by private corporate power or by
socially-enforced civility rules). Nevertheless, it is hard to believe
that Chicago’s content discrimination showed that Chicago
favored labor picketing over—much less wanted to suppress—
assemblies celebrating the Fourth of July or speech promoting
re-election of the mayor.
At least in Mosley’s street-speech context, the Court’s only
relevant argument easily follows from autonomy theory—though
not, or at least not easily, from other theories. Specifically, the
Court said: “Although preventing school disruption is a city’s
legitimate concern, Chicago itself has determined that peaceful
labor picketing during school hours is not an undue interference
53. Id. at 95–96.
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with school. Therefore, . . . Chicago may not maintain that other
picketing disrupts the school unless that picketing is clearly more
54
disruptive than the picketing Chicago already permits.” From
the perspective of valuing autonomy, although government
clearly must be permitted to use public property to advance
public projects and, thus, to impose time and place limits on
speech that constitute actual interferences with these projects,
respect for individual expressive autonomy means that the
expression must be allowed on public property when it does not
constitute such an interference. Here, the rule against content
discrimination serves merely as an evidentiary ground for finding
that this respect for autonomy is absent. “The crucial question,”
no matter whether the person wants “to ask the time or the
55
weather forecast” or to engage in protest, “is whether the
manner of expression is basically incompatible with the normal
56
activity of a particular place at a particular time.”
Institutionally bound speech and unconstitutional
conditions. These huge topics cannot be adequately explored
here but since they are often said to embarrass autonomy
theories, I briefly suggest, to the contrary, that autonomy theory
provides the best insight into the morass. When government sets
up a governmental structure—a court, legislature, an
57
administrative agency, or, I have argued, an election —or when
it offers a job or a grant, a person (say, an autonomous agent)
58
who chooses to become enmeshed must accept those
restrictions on her autonomy that are necessary for the
54. Id. at 100. (citations omitted). The Court treated this argument as an equal
protection matter and later noted that disruption can be handled by a more “narrowly
tailored” or “narrowly drawn” statute. Id. at 101–02. Interestingly, though citing equal
protection cases for the narrowly tailored standard, all other cases cited to illustrate why
the law failed this constitutional standard were First Amendment cases. See id. at 101 n.8;
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969) (prohibiting the
wearing of armbands violates rights of expression); United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S.
367, 386 (1968) (holding that burning a selective service card is not symbolic speech);
Niemotko v. Md., 340 U.S. 268, 273 (1951) (holding that charging defendants for religious
meetings in a public park violated protection of speech and religion); Saia v. N.Y., 334
U.S. 558, 562 (1948) (holding that banning loudspeakers in a general way violated
freedom of speech).
55. Hill v. Colo., 530 US 703, 768 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
56. Grayned v. Rockford, 408 US 104, 116 (1972).
57. See generally C. Edwin Baker, Campaign Expenditures and Free Speech, 33
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1998) (arguing that elections and campaign speech should be
distinguished from the broader category of political speech in First Amendment
doctrine).
58. Thus, restrictions on out of court statements by criminal defendants or
witnesses called by subpoena should be much more problematic than restrictions on the
prosecution or police for an autonomy theory.
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legitimate operation of the institution, successful carrying out
the aims of the grant program, or proper performance of the job.
This is the compatibility standard noted in the paragraph above.
Though there is a role-based contextual loss of authority
(autonomy) over both her political and non-political speech, this
loss is not inconsistent with the general attribution of autonomy.
The limits do not disrespect as opposed to presuppose the
person’s general status as an autonomous agent. The limit
becomes disrespect only when the condition or institutionallybound contextual restriction on expression is not required by the
legitimate functions of the institution or goals of the job or grant.
Other theories may reach similar conclusions though
arguably the autonomy theory is most straightforward at getting
at what is normatively at stake. Post’s political discourse theory,
for example, might do so because, at bottom it is an autonomy
theory that differs from the one I offer most overtly in that it
attributes autonomy to a person only when and because the
person is participating in public discourse. Since, however, his
theory does not make an attribution of autonomy as a
fundamental baseline but rather only contextually when a person
is participating in public discourse, it presents a quandary. A
person presumptively has no (attributed) autonomy despite
59
speech with overt political relevance (as in Connick ) when
enmeshed in activities organized by the government in exercise
60
of it managerial (as opposed to its governance) authority. To be
consistent with the case law, however, his theory must explain
why a person sometimes suddenly obtains the attributed political
discourse-based autonomy when engaged in politically-themed
but assertedly private banter with a boy friend or in private
61
discussions with her supervisor.
59. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983) (holding that the discharge of an
assistant district attorney for political speech did not violate the First Amendment).
60. See, e.g., POST, supra note 20, at 179–98 (discussing concepts of democratic
community from “the specific perspective of the American legal system”).
61. Rankin v. McPherson. 483 U.S. 378, 392 (1987) (holding that in some cases
involving private conversation matters of public concern still trigger First Amendment
rights); Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 417 (1979) (holding that
public employees do not lose the right of free speech because of arranging to speak
privately with an employer). Weinstein’s politically-centered theory emphasizes political
content more than context, and, therefore, avoids Post’s precise problem. He could also
argue that autonomy theory has trouble here because the Court requires the speech be
about a matter of “public concern.” Though I find the propriety of the limitation to
matters of “public concern” doubtful, I can understand that a court which wanted to
avoid continual second guessing of routine employment matters might conclude that
firings due to the speech in categories that it does not protect in this context will seldom
really reflect dismissal for lack of cause and that adequate protection can be best left to
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More. I have avoided discussion of defamation law, possibly
the area where case law most obviously contradicts my
62
understanding of autonomy theory. And other areas obviously
could be examined—hate speech and copyright and privacy
would be obvious additions—but I fear that I have already overburdened the patience of readers. Those areas discussed here
suffice to show, I believe, how autonomy theory best explains
many results that I, and I believe most First Amendment
commentators, approve and shows that its critical force, giving
specific, contested (but I believe persuasive) answers in areas
that conflict with currently prevailing doctrine and in areas
where controversy continues to rage.

normal contract law or labor activism.
62. Contrary to the Court, autonomy theory would, I believe, justify general
application of the New York Times standard: “[K]nowledge that [the defamatory
content] was false or with reckless disregard of whether it is false or not.” N.Y. Times Co.
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964). I would think, though, that Post would also have
trouble here. The Court’s restriction of constitutional protection to talk about public
officials and figures and, with reduced protection, to talk about public issues provides a
content, not a public discourse, focus—making it possibly consistent with Meiklejohn’s
political speech theory, but not Post’s. I do not see, for example, how Post could
conclude that I would be engaged in public discourse if I told mutual friends in private
that Congressman Dan is a thief in order to help them protect their personal assets in
their personal dealings with Dan. Cf. Post, supra note 1.

